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In three experiments we investigated cryptomnesia (unconscious plagiarism) and source memory using a word-search puzzle task. Subjects first alternated with a "computer partner" in locating words from 4 puzzles. They then attempted to recall their previously generated items as well as to locate additional new words. Substantially more plagiarism was committed in these tasks than was observed in a study by A. S. Brown and D. R. Murphy (1989) , in which Ss generated category exemplars. Manipulations of retention interval (Experiment 1) and degree of encoding (Experiments 2a and 2b) reliably influenced plagiarism rates. Source confusions from a modified recognition memory task (Experiment 3) were used as the basis for a unitary relative strength model to explain both source and occurrence (item) forgetting.
Recent experimental results have shown fascinating dissociations between implicit (or indirect) tests of memory versus explicit (or direct) ones (Roediger, 1990; Schacter, 1987) . Implicit tasks such as word fragment completion and degraded word identification demonstrate that people may use information from their past experience while reporting neither awareness of that past nor a conscious attempt to retrieve it. A related phenomenon, and the focus of this article, is cryptomnesia. Cryptomnesia is the unconscious influence of memory that causes current thoughts to be (wrongly) experienced as novel or original inventions (Taylor, 1965) . Cryptomnesia may occur whenever people compose a melody, solve a pressing problem, write a verse of poetry, or generate a research idea under the belief that the product is original and stems from their own creativity; in fact, however, what was generated is someone else's innovation (or even one's own) encountered sometime previously and then forgotten. When cryptomnesia arises in published literature or scholarly ideas, the phenomenon constitutes unconscious or inadvertent plagiarism. Our use of the term plagiarism is much different from intentional plagiarism whereby motives, mechanisms, and tools for detection are fairly well defined (Glatt & Haertel, 1982; Owens & Hardley, 1985; Standing & Gorassini, 1986) .
Unintentional plagiarism had proved difficult to study because no laboratory analogue had been constructed. How-ever, one such procedure was recently devised by Brown and Murphy (1989) . In their first experiment, each subject took turns in a "round-robin" with three other people generating exemplars from semantic categories (e.g., articles of clothing, sports, etc.). All subjects were admonished not to repeat another subject's responses. After four cycles of this roundrobin generation, subjects engaged in two additional tasks. In a "recall-own task," subjects were asked to recall the category items they had generated; in a "recall-new task," they were asked to generate additional new items from the categories that neither they nor their fellow subjects had given previously. An instance of inadvertent plagiarism was counted whenever a subject duplicated his or her own or another's earlier associate. Brown and Murphy's results indicate that a substantial amount of cryptomnesia occurs (from 3% to 9% depending on the task) above and beyond self-repetition rates. Subjects also plagiarized others' words at a higher rate than their own in the recall-new task. The excessive "theft" of their partners' words over selfplagiarism suggests that people monitor self-generated and other-generated information in somewhat different ways.
In their Experiment 2, Brown and Murphy (1989) increased the difficulty of the task either by using orthographic categories (e.g., words beginning with th) or by increasing the number of semantic categories from which subjects were simultaneously generating. These manipulations were designed to make it more difficult for subjects to track and remember responses generated by others. The results indicate that, as monitoring difficulty increased, so did the amount of inadvertent plagiarism. In a final experiment, they demonstrated that cryptomnesia occurred not only in a social context (with other subjects) but also when subjects were tested individually and other-generated information was presented visually.
Cryptomnesia is conceptually related to source forgetting, a phenomenon studied by Johnson and her colleagues under the name reality monitoring (e.g., Johnson, Kahan, & Raye, 1984; . Those experiments demonstrated that people have difficulty in determining whether events were internally generated (e.g., imaginative fantasy or daydreaming) or were actually experienced externally. Memory for source was improved when subjects actively gener-ated items rather than merely listening to them passively (Raye & Johnson, 1980) . Despite the similarity to cryptomnesia, the confusions encountered by subjects in reality monitoring experiments differ somewhat from inadvertent plagiarism. Cryptomnesia is closer to source amnesia, which occurs when subjects fail to recognize that they had ever seen an earlier-presented item within the experimental context. Source forgetting tends to be a less dramatic failure of memory than source amnesia because the former reflects only the loss of an item's origin, whereas the latter reflects the loss of the entire episodic trace (Schacter, Harbluk, & McLachlan, 1984) . A study by Brown and Halliday (1991) examined how retention interval differentially affected item and source memory; their results suggested that source forgetting was greater than source amnesia over a week's delay.
The studies of cryptomnesia by Brown and his colleagues are important in several respects. First, they showed that information, from oneself as well as from others, can be inadvertently plagiarized shortly after its initial exposure. Second, because unconscious plagiarism increases with the difficulty of the monitoring task, it is plausible that previously encountered items remain activated above baseline after initial exposure, but information regarding their "source" fades rapidly. Brown and Halliday's (1991) results support the idea that source memory is partly independent of episodic memory, a hypothesis suggested by studies of transitory amnesic states after electroconvulsive shock therapy (Shimamura & Squire, 1987) as well as studies of normal subjects engaged in list recall (Voss, Vesonder, Post, & Ney, 1987) . Third, the amount of plagiarism they observed serves as a clear example of Jacoby and Kelly's (1987) claim that memory representations can often be used without any subjective feeling of remembering. Fourth, their methods provided a controlled generation framework within which to study cryptomnesia and other unconscious influences in a recall task.
The purpose of our research was to investigate the generality of Brown and Murphy's (1989) findings in a different domain and to assess the impact of standard learning variables on cryptomnesia and source monitoring. Because the more dramatic examples of cryptomnesia arise when people are engaged in creative tasks (thinking, writing, composing, etc.) , we devised a paradigm that moves away from the Brown and Murphy procedure requiring subjects to simply retrieve items from semantic memory. Our goal was to develop a task that engaged subjects to search for creative problem solutions but also constrained their productions sufficiently so that duplications could be identified and counted during generation and recall. In the procedure we created, subjects worked on a problem-solving puzzle task similar to the popular game of Boggle. Presented with a 4 X 4 matrix of letters, subjects were asked to compose English words of three letters or longer by stringing together adjacent letters that "touched" in any direction in the matrix. By having subjects alternate locating words with their "computer partners" and requiring them to engage in recall-own and recall-new tasks, we were able to mirror Brown and Murphy's (1989, Experiment 3) procedure closely. Where our approach and theirs diverged, however, was in the use of a problem-solving task that seemed to be closer to circumstances under which inadvertent plagiarism might occur naturally.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was designed to assess whether a substantial level of inadvertent plagiarism could be elicited from subjects engaged in this creative task. We manipulated the retention interval and amount of interfering material between the generation phase and the recall-own and generate-new tasks.
1 Pilot investigations indicated that short retention intervals (approximately 5 min) with unrelated interfering material (an arithmetic task) had little or no effect on the amount of unconscious plagiarism. Therefore, we modified Brown and Murphy's (1989) procedure so that subjects in an immediate test condition performed the recall-own and generate-new tasks directly following the generation phase of working on a Boggle puzzle. In a delayed test condition, we mimicked Brown and Murphy's procedure by having subjects engage in four generation phases (in our case, from four different puzzles) before attempting the recall-own and generate-new tasks for all four puzzles in succession. This study was conducted before we learned of Brown and Halliday 's (1991) investigation of cryptomnesia at different retention intervals; thus, this study serves as an extension and conceptual replication of that work.
Method
Subjects. Sixty-two Stanford University undergraduates volunteered and received course credit for their participation. Twenty subjects were assigned to a preliminary puzzle-norming study, as described later. The remaining 42 subjects were randomly assigned to the immediate-and delayed-recall test conditions. Through the misassignment of 1 subject, the immediate and delayed test conditions contained 20 and 22 subjects, respectively. All subjects were tested individually.
Materials, design, and apparatus. Four Boggle puzzles were constructed with the aid of a computer and an on-line dictionary. Each puzzle contained 16 letters that were arranged in a square 4 X 4 grid (an example is given in the Appendix). The puzzles were constructed under three constraints. First, two of the four puzzles were designed to be difficult and two were designed to be easy, as determined by the total number of words that could be formed in them. The two difficult puzzles contained 32 and 43 words; the two easy puzzles had a total of 112 and 113 words. Second, the experimental puzzles were constructed to minimize the number of words shared between any two puzzles (and the practice puzzle). In 8 of the 10 pairwise overlaps, we achieved 0, 1, or 2 words of duplication. For the pair of easy puzzles and another pair including an easy puzzle and the practice puzzle, however, the minimum overlap we could achieve was 7 words. Fortunately, many of these 7 logically possible words were uncommon (e.g., eon, oat) and were in fact never discovered by our subjects.
The third and final constraint limited the number of allowable solution words in the puzzles. In addition to shared words between puzzles, we sought to minimize the orthographic overlap of words within any given puzzle. To do this, we modified the rules of the standard Boggle game in the following manner: First, a valid word had to be three letters or longer. Second, no proper nouns were allowed. Third, words formed by adding or deleting a suffix or an affix were generally not allowed, and subjects learned that only root forms of words would be acceptable solutions. For example, note was valid but no and notes was not; mix was valid but remix, mixed, and mixer were not. When subjects entered one of these variants, an error tone sounded reminding them to enter only the root form of the word. Although these changes did not entirely eliminate all orthographic similarity, they did ensure that any variant was semantically unrelated to any other word.
Tasks within the experiment were analyzed with a 2 X 2 mixed factorial design, with one between-subjects (immediate vs. delayed recall) and one within-subjects (easy vs. difficult puzzles) factor. As did Brown and Murphy (1989) , we also performed "global" analyses across the generation, recall-own, and generate-new tasks. Incorporating the task factor converted this to a 3 X 2 X 2 mixed factorial design. All puzzles were displayed in the center of an IBM XT computer under control of software written for these experiments.
Normative study. Because subjects would be alternating turns with their computer partner, it was important to establish the normative frequency with which subjects would locate each word within each puzzle. Our goal in obtaining the "Boggle word norms" was to ensure that the computer partners would simulate a natural order in the production of words. After a practice puzzle in which the procedure was explained, our 20 norming subjects were given 9 min per puzzle, with the order of the puzzles being randomized for each subject. Subjects were prompted for a word below the puzzle grid and were instructed to type in the words as they were found; they were also told to avoid repetitions. As each word was entered, it was verified as correct and placed elsewhere on the screen for later reference. Subjects were required to use the entire 9 min and to complete all four puzzles. For the two more difficult puzzles, subjects found an average of 14.25 and 13.25 words, representing 44.5% and 30.9% of the total number of possible words, respectively; in the two easier puzzles, the mean number of words found was 33.95 and 30.10, representing 30.4% and 26.8% of the total number of words in each puzzle, respectively. Each word that was located was assigned a serial position corresponding to the order in which it was found by that subject (e.g., 1 for the first word found, 4 for the fourth found, etc.). Words that were not located were assigned to the last possible serial position for that puzzle. The mean serial position across subjects was calculated for each possible item and then used to determine in what order future subjects would be presented with words from their computer partner.
Procedure. At the start of the experiment, subjects received detailed on-screen instructions and examples of the procedures they were to follow. They worked on the generation task of a practice puzzle with the experimenter, who was available to answer questions and to correct mistakes (practice was otherwise identical in every respect to the experimental task). In this task, subjects saw the current puzzle presented in the middle of the computer screen. Centered directly below the puzzle, their computer partner would print a word that subjects were instructed to find and then to press a key verifying that they had done so. After a short delay, the computer displayed its second word. Once the subject had verified that word, a third computer-provided item appeared. Following its verification, subjects were prompted in the same location where the computer's words had appeared; it was then their turn to locate a word in the puzzle. Incorrect responses (nonwords, words formed through violations of the rules, etc.) caused an error tone, and subjects had to try again, being required to generate a legal item before proceeding. Plagiarisms were never considered to be incorrect responses.
This procedure of alternating between three computer words and one subject word was repeated a total of four times for each puzzle. Thus, by the end of working on each puzzle, the computer had generated a total of 12 words and the subject had generated a total of 4 words. The computer-generated words were those located at odd serial positions (as calculated from the normative subjects) and presented in decreasing order (e.g., 1,3,5, etc.) to simulate a natural elicitation sequence. If a subject had previously used one of these words, the program caused the computer to jump to the next available word (to avoid plagiarizing the subject). The order of the four puzzles was randomized for each subject.
For subjects in the immediate test condition, the recall-own and generate-new procedures were explained following the generation portion of the practice puzzle. For these tasks, the puzzle was present on the screen again in order to help reinstate the original context of the generation phase. Four numbered lines appeared below the matrix and subjects were required to type four answers on them in each of the following two tasks. In the recall-own task, they were instructed to type the four words that they had found in that puzzle. After entering each item, subjects rated their confidence on a 3-point scale ranging from "I'm definitely sure" to "somewhat sure" to "I'm guessing" (after Brown & Murphy, 1989 ). An identical procedure was used for the generate-new task in which subjects were instructed to discover and required to type in four new words that neither they nor their computer partner had found before.
The procedure differed slightly for subjects in the delayed test condition. Following generation with the practice puzzle, subjects engaged in the generation task on each of the four experimental puzzles. Subjects were not told that they would later have to remember the items they (and the computer) were generating. After generating items for the four puzzles, subjects then received the same instructions and practice for the recall-own and generate-new tasks as had subjects in the immediate test condition. In this delayed test condition, the puzzles were presented for recall in the same order as subjects had worked on them in the generation phase. For delayed subjects, the task order could therefore be denoted as Gi, G 2 , G 3 , G 4 , RO], GN,, RO 2 , and so on (where G, refers to generation for the i" 1 puzzle, RO refers to the recall-own task, and GN refers to the generate-new task). For subjects in the immediate test condition, the task order would be denoted G|, RO,, GN,, G 2 , RO 2 , GN 2 , and so forth.
Control comparison. Appropriate controls for comparison to the experimental conditions are somewhat complex and are thoroughly discussed by Brown and Murphy (1989) . In their category generation tasks, Brown and colleagues adopted a 1.6% plagiarism rate estimated from the repetition rate of subjects orally generating exemplars from a single semantic category (Gruenewald & Lockhead, 1980) . Although most duplications in free recall tend to arise near the end of generation and stem from items produced much earlier in the recall process, various instructions to subjects, such as to recall in strict serial order of item presentation (forward or reverse), will alter this repetition rate 1.6%-5.7% Gardiner, Passmore, Herriot, & Klee, 1977; . Brown and his colleagues considered 1.6% to be a liberal estimate because their task required retrieval from long-term memory, thus attenuating the end-of-list repetitions seen in free recall of word lists. We were reluctant to adopt one of these episodic rates because our puzzle task was specifically designed to depart from generating items out of semantic memory, and these episodic rates are likely to be different from a baseline "Boggle cryptomnesia." Results from Brown and Murphy's second experiment may provide a somewhat better baseline; in that study subjects repeatedly generated items from orthographic categories (e.g., words beginning with th). Because there was little or no categorical structure to solutions in our puzzle task, even those orthographic plagiarism rates seemed somewhat inadequate. Nevertheless, our study was patterned after Brown and Murphy's, and a comparison of their cryptomnesia rates (both semantic and orthographic generation) with our findings is provided later.
An additional factor that could have reduced duplication rates in a control condition was that our immediate-recall subjects knew that they would have to recall their own words, and some of our subjects reported that they had attempted to rehearse them. This knowledge gave the condition an "intentional learning" character not found in the delayed condition and might have acted to reduce the relative number of errors that these subjects were prone to make. Subjects in the delayed condition were not informed of the recall-own or generate-new tasks until they had already completed the generation phase on all four puzzles. This intentional versus incidental nature of our conditions further obscured the "correct" choice of a control comparison level of cryptomnesia. Figure 1 summarizes the results from this experiment with the proportion of incorrect responses shown separately for each task. We discuss the data from each phase of the experiment separately and in sequence.
Results and Discussion
Generation. Subjects in the immediate-recall condition produced 31 plagiarisms, or 10.3% (SE M = 2.2) of the total number of words they generated, with two of these being self-plagiarisms (a subject repeating his or her own word). Similarly, in the delayed-recall condition, subjects plagiarized 39 of their computer partner's words and 2 of their own earlier responses, which accounted for 12.2% (SE M = 1.9). Both rates were significantly higher than either Brown and Murphy's (1989 Figure I . Proportion of incorrect responses in Experiment 1 by task and by type. ("Rec-own" refers to the recall-own task, and "gen-new" denotes plagiarism in the generate-new task.)
head, 1980). These levels were, however, comparable to subjects generating from orthographic categories (Brown & Murphy's Experiment 2). As expected, the amount of cryptomnesia during generation did not differ between the two conditions, F(\, 40) < l,p > .10. Moreover, subjects in the two conditions responded similarly to puzzle difficulty, F( 1, 40) < 1. Puzzle difficulty (i.e., the number of words in a puzzle), however, did increase overall plagiarism, F(\, 40) = 10.3, p < .01. Significantly more plagiarism was found for difficult puzzles (immediate = 13.8%, delayed = 16.5%) than for easier ones (immediate = 6.9%, delayed = 8.0%).
Recall-own task. In this task, with a puzzle in front of them, subjects attempted to recall the four words they had generated earlier from it. Any word that had been plagiarized in the generation phase was not double-counted as an instance of cryptomnesia in the recall-own task. As is evident in Figure 1 , subjects in the delayed condition plagiarized far more (112 items, or 31.8%; SE M = 2.3) than did subjects in the immediate condition (24 items, or 7.5%; SE M = 2.2). This difference was significant, F(l, 40) = 57.1, p < .001, and did not interact with puzzle difficulty, F( 1, 40) < 1, p > . 10. Although slightly more cryptomnesia occurred with the harder puzzles (immediate = 8.1%, delayed = 35.2%) than with the easier ones (immediate = 6.9%, delayed = 28.4%), the differences were not significant, F{ 1,40) = \.9\,p > .10. Brown and Murphy (1989) found a 3.9% plagiarism rate when subjects recalled their own semantic category exemplars (Experiment 3) and an average of 14.1% when orthographic categories were used (Experiment 2). We found slightly more plagiarism than this in the immediate condition of our paradigm, although not enough to claim a difference from their semantic generation task. However, we observed nearly nine times as much when recall tests were delayed (directly mirroring their procedure) using their semantic task as baseline and more than twice as much using their orthographic task for comparison. Overall, our paradigm seemed to elicit markedly more inadvertent plagiarism.
In the recall-own task, subjects could produce new Boggle words that they neither plagiarized nor originally generated themselves. The pattern of these "recall-own errors" differed slightly from the pattern of cryptomnesia. Subjects in the delayed condition claimed that 65 new items (18.5%; SE M = 2.6) were originally their own words, whereas subjects in the immediate condition claimed only 24 new items as old (7.5%; SE M = 1.6). This difference was significant, F( 1, 40) = 11.9, p < .01, and did not interact with puzzle difficulty, F(l, 40) = 2.97, p > .05. More of these intrusion errors, however, were made working on the easy puzzles (immediate = 9.4%, delayed = 25.6%) than on the difficult ones (immediate = 5.6%, delayed = 11.4%); overall main effect, F( 1, 40) = 8.75, p < .01. This outcome is consistent with the idea that many words are readily available for intrusion in the easier puzzles. Compared with Brown and Murphy's (1989) rates, we again found a substantially higher proportion of errors in our delayed condition, but we found comparable levels when the recall-own task immediately followed initial generation.
Plagiarisms in all three tasks tended to be from highfrequency (i.e., lower mean serial position) words generated earlier in each puzzle sequence. If the computer had not skipped ahead in its generation sequence in order to avoid plagiarizing a subject's response (recall that the computer gave responses at odd serial positions only), the mean serial position of its words would have been 12.0; in fact, for both conditions the obtained mean was 12.2. The mean serial positions for plagiarized responses were 6.1, 8.3, and 9.6 for each successive task from generation to generate-new. These means were less than 12.0 (« > 4.5, ps < .01), but did not differ between the two conditions. The lower mean serial position observed for plagiarisms during generation (6.1) as compared with the recall-own and generate-new tasks suggests that subjects will better remember the most recent words generated by the computer (and thereby plagiarize only earlier computer responses).
In a final analysis, we compared the plagiarism rate with the intrusion error rate of new words. Included in the analysis were the factors of recall condition (immediate vs. delayed), error type (recall-own plagiarism vs. recall-own error), and puzzle difficulty. Although all three main effects were substantial (all Fs > 24.9, ps < .001), the significant interaction between task condition and error type was of primary concern, F(2, 80) = 14.65, p < .001. As seen in Figure 1 , there was little difference between the plagiarism and the error rate for the immediate condition but a large difference when recall tasks were delayed. Subjects in the delayed test condition intruded previously encountered computer items at a significantly higher rate than they were introducing new items. The effect was not present in the immediate condition, which suggests that delay, interfering material, or both are substantial contributors to the occurrence of cryptomnesia. Furthermore, these contributions far outweighed any increase in repetition rates caused by the short-term retention of items as in the standard list recall studies performed by Gardiner and his colleagues. As noted earlier, puzzle difficulty did not seem to influence the rate of plagiarism, but it did affect the number of new word intrusions, F(l, 40) = 6.40, p < .05, because of the greater availability of intrusion candidates in the easy puzzles.
Generate-new task. In this task, subjects were instructed to discover four new words in each puzzle that neither they nor the computer had found in the earlier generation phase. Subjects could err by plagiarizing either their computer partner or themselves (self-plagiarisms). In Figure 1 , partner plagiarisms are separated from self-plagiarisms because the amount of self-plagiarism was substantially greater in our puzzle paradigm than Brown and Murphy (1989, Experiment 3) observed in their semantic category generation task. The analyses we report, however, were pooled over this distinction because both types of plagiarisms showed an identical pattern of effects and statistical significance. Not surprisingly, more duplication of the computer's words was observed in the delayed condition (partner = 99 items, or 28.1 %, SE M = 2.8; self = 26 items, or 7.4%, SE M = 1.6) than when the tasks were undertaken immediately after initial generation (partner = 56 items, or 17.5%, SE M = 2.7; self = 8 items, or 2.5%, SE M -1.0). As in the recall-own task, this pattern was significant, F( 1,40) = 11.0, p < .01, but did not interact with puzzle difficulty, F(l, 40) < 1, p > .10.
More partner and self-plagiarisms were observed when subjects tried to find words in more difficult puzzles (immediate = 29.4%, delayed = 44.9%) than in the easier ones (immediate = 10.6%, delayed = 26.1%); overall main effect, F(l, 40) = 25.47, p < .001. This influence of puzzle difficulty was consistent with performance during initial generation. The incidence of partner plagiarism here, exceeding 17% in the immediate and 28% in the delayed task conditions, was much greater than the 9.8% exhibited by Brown and Murphy's (1989, Experiment 3) subjects, who generated from semantic categories. It was also higher than the 15% exhibited by subjects performing the orthographic equivalent (Experiment 2).
Combined analyses. We performed an overall analysis across the three task types (generation, recall-own, and generate-new) including the factors of recall condition and puzzle difficulty.
2 When the overall amounts were pooled over the recall condition, plagiarisms tended to increase as subjects progressed through the task sequence from initial generation to the recall-own to the generate-new task, F(2, 80) = 31.25, p < .001. Similar to Brown and Murphy's (1989) results, all three pairwise tests were significant (ps < .01), but it is not clear whether the progressive increase was caused by the passage of time or the actual task in which subjects engaged. Our immediate versus delayed test manipulation, however, shed light on this issue. Delayed tests produced far more plagiarism than did immediate ones, F(l, 40) = 24.93, p < .001, and this effect was found only in the recall-own and generate-new tasks, with no effect of recall condition shown in initial generation, F(2, 80) = 14.65, p < .001. Because the only difference between the two conditions was the passage of time and the introduction of interfering material subsequent to initial generation (recall that delayed subjects generated initial items for all puzzles before engaging in the recall-own and generate-new tasks), these data suggest that the rise in cryptomnesia across tasks was caused by an increase in retention interval (which was approximately 20 min) rather than to the task per se. This conclusion is consistent with Brown and Halliday's (1991) result showing more plagiarism when the retention interval was increased from 1 to 7 days.
Our manipulation of puzzle difficulty influenced the rate of plagiarism when subjects were generating new items (initial generation or generate-new task) but not when they were trying to recall their own words, F(2, 80) = 6.63, p < .01. This result might have been caused by subjects basing their discrimination of self-generated versus other-generated items on the ease with which words were composed; easily formed words were judged more likely to be one's own. Consistent with this interpretation were the data from the recall-own task in which new-word intrusions came largely from the easier puzzles. Because there were more words to be easily constructed, subjects might have mistakenly taken the ease of construction as indicating that they had found the item before (especially if the item could not be identified as one of the computer's words).
In a final analysis, we correlated the amount of plagiarism across subjects for each pair of tasks. All three correlations indicated a significant positive relationship (generate vs. recall-own = .31, generate vs. generate-new = .33, and recall-own vs. generate-new = .62) and did not greatly differ between the two conditions. These significant positive correlations departed from those of Brown and Murphy (1989, Experiment 1) , who reported similar correlations as "nonsignificant and ranged from -.32 to .10" (p. 435). They interpreted their results as support for the generality of the phenomenon, arguing that significant correlations would arise if some subset of subjects was responsible for most of the plagiarism (resulting in a set of bimodal distributions of plagiarism). Given their overall low rates of plagiarism (from 3.6% to 8.6%), however, their nonsignificant correlations might simply have resulted from a severe restriction in the range of observed rates. We examined our distributions of plagiarism in each task and found no evidence of bimodality. To confirm this, we submitted each distribution to a Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit test against a hypothetical normal distribution. This test determines the degree of departure from normality and, as expected, the tests indicated that our distributions were indeed normal. We therefore interpreted our significant positive correlations as reflecting some stable individual differences that affect all plagiarism measures similarly (e.g., high or low criteria for claiming an item as "own").
Confidence ratings. Subjects rated their confidence for each word they gave in the recall-own and recall-new tasks on a 3-point scale ranging from positive to guessing (after Brown & Murphy, 1989) . Because only a small number of subjects committed each and every type of error, we were limited in our statistical tests to pooling across tasks (recallown, generate-new); the full distribution of subjects' confidence ratings is given in Table 1 . For the recall-own task, subjects' confidence ratings were fairly well calibrated. Subjects were highly confident (positive) when they correctly recalled their own items; when they plagiarized the computer or intruded a new word, slightly more than half of the time they stated that they were completely unsure (guess) about their response. Nonetheless, these results do indicate that approximately 40% of their plagiarisms received a positive or somewhat confident rating.
In the generate-new task, subjects were again highly confident when they had found a new word, slightly less so when they plagiarized the computer, and most unsure when they committed self-plagiarisms. Confidence was higher in the generate-new task than in the recall-own task, F(l, 40) = 4.15, p < .05; a full 60%-80% of the plagiarisms in the generate-new task were given a positive to somewhat confident rating. Although all of these patterns held for subjects in both recall conditions, delayed test subjects were less confident overall than subjects in the immediate test condition, F( 1,40) = 37.74, p < .001. Also, confidence was lower when subjects recalled items from harder puzzles than from easy ones, F(\, 40) = 8.62, p < .01. In summary, although sub- jects were confident in their correct responses, they also claimed significant certainty for many of their plagiarized responses. We take this high confidence as additional evidence that these plagiarisms were true cryptomnesia in which subjects wrongly believed that they were generating items unique to them in the current context.
Summary
Following Brown and Murphy's (1989) general procedures, our puzzle paradigm yielded substantial amounts of inadvertent plagiarism across tasks and measures. In general, the rate of cryptomnesia was far greater than that observed in their semantic category generation task, and it was also larger than that observed in their orthographic task. Performance was similar in our immediate and delayed conditions during initial generation, but the main difference between these groups was the time and activity that transpired after initial generation and the knowledge of testing and recall provided to subjects in the immediate condition. In the recallown and recall-new tasks, plagiarism was greater for our delayed group than for those tested immediately. Difficult puzzles produced more plagiarism, but only when subjects attempted to generate new items, not when they recalled their own words. Subjects intruded previously encountered items at a far greater rate than they intruded new words. Finally, the pattern of confidence ratings showed that subjects believed that a large proportion of their plagiarized items were in fact new or novel, a fundamental component in the definition of cryptomnesia.
Experiment 2a
The results of Experiment 1 indicate that inadvertent plagiarism increased with increasing retention interval and interfering material (and with incidental rather than intentional learning set). The purpose of Experiments 2a and 2b was to determine the degree to which initial stimulus encoding would affect the rate of cryptomnesia. We compared plagiarism rates following a "deep semantic" encoding task with those following a "superficial physical" task from the levels of processing literature (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) . However, no obvious prediction can be made regarding the influence of depth of processing on later plagiarism rates. On the one hand, deeper semantic processing of words could reduce the amount of plagiarism by making items more memorable and perhaps increasing the discriminability between selfgenerated and other-generated material. On the other hand, performing the same orienting task on both self-and othergenerated items may increase source confusion and thereby increase the unconscious plagiarism rate. In the Voss et al. (1987) study, subjects were better at recognizing their own old items than other-generated material, but they were no better at identifying the source of their own words than those produced by their partner. If source and episodic memory are independent, then it is not clear what net effect different orienting tasks may have on the overall plagiarism rate. In this study, we compared a semantic with a physical judgment task using the puzzle paradigm devised for Experiment 1.
Method
Subjects. Thirty-two Stanford University undergraduates served as volunteers and were awarded course credit for participation; none had served in Experiment 1. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two orienting tasks-semantic or physical judgments-with 16 serving in each group. All subjects were tested individually.
Materials and design. The four puzzles from Experiment 1 were used again. The experiment-controlling software was revised to accept subjects' yes-no decisions on one of two orienting tasks and to collect reaction times for the recall-own and recall-new tasks. The materials and equipment were otherwise identical to those in Experiment 1. The design was like that of Experiment 1 with two levels of a between-subjects factor (physical or semantic judgment task) and the easy versus difficult puzzle type remaining a withinsubjects factor. As before, the type of task (generation, recall-own, and generate-new) factor was added for the global analyses, thus requiring a 3 X 2 X 2 mixed factorial design.
Procedure. Tasks were performed in the same order as in the delayed test condition of Experiment 1; subjects generated items for each of the four puzzles before proceeding to the recall-own and generate-new tasks on each of the puzzles. The puzzle order was randomized for each subject but was identical in the recall-own and generate-new tasks to that which the subject had encountered during initial generation. Subjects in the physical orienting condition decided whether the generated words were four letters or longer, a length chosen to nearly equate the number of correct yes-no decisions. Subjects in the semantic orienting condition decided whether the word represented or was associated with "something good" (Nelson, 1977; Seamon & Virostek, 1978) . In both conditions, after either the computer had generated a word or subjects had entered their own word, a prompt appeared that was consistent with the subjects' assigned task. Subjects responded yes or no by pressing one of two keys on the keyboard. Subjects made decisions about all words, both theirs and those of their computer partner. With the exception of the orienting task during the generation phase, the testing procedure was otherwise the same for both groups.
Results and Discussion
The overall proportions of incorrect responses are summarized in Figure 2 . Again, we discuss the results in the order of the three tasks that subjects undertook in the experiment.
Generation. During initial generation, no self plagiarisms were observed. Subjects in the physical orienting condition, however, plagiarized 29 words from their computer partner, or 11.3% (SE M = 3.5) of the total number possible. In the semantic condition, subjects plagiarized only 9 words, or 3.5% (SE M = 1.5) of the total. These rates of cryptomnesia differed reliably between the two orienting groups, with superficial processing of the original words leading to more unconscious plagiarism, F(l, 30) = 4.24, p < .05. Subjects plagiarized more for hard puzzles (physical = 14.8%, semantic = 4.7%) than for easy ones (physical = 7.8%, semantic = 2.3%); overall main effect, F(l, 30) = 4.17, p = .05. Puzzle difficulty, however, did not interact with orienting tasks, F( 1, 30) = 1.04, p > . 10. These patterns paralleled the plagiarisms observed during generation in Experiment 1. The main difference was that subjects given a semantic orienting task committed markedly fewer plagiarisms than did either subjects who were forced to make superficial stimulus judgments (physical condition) or subjects who made no decisions at all (both conditions of Experiment 1).
Recall-own task. The level of processing manipulation did not reliably affect cryptomnesia in the recall-own task, 
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items, or 25.4%; SE M = 2.9). As in Experiment 1, attempting to recall one's own words from hard puzzles (physical = 26.6%, semantic = 20.3) led to no more unconscious plagiarism than did recalling words from easier puzzles (physical = 24.2%, semantic = 21.1%); also, puzzle difficulty did not interact with orienting task (Fs < 1, ps > .10). The overall rates of cryptomnesia in the recall-own task, however, were still five or six times larger than that observed by Brown and Murphy (1989, Experiment 3) for semantic generation and twice as large for orthographic generation (Experiment 2). Counting the number of new-word intrusions that subjects claimed as their own earlier productions, the semantic processors intruded slightly fewer (36 items, or 14.1%; SE M = 2.2) than the word-length processors (50 items, or 20.3%; SE M = 3.0), but this difference failed to reach statistical significance, F(l, 30) = 2.61,/? > .10. As in Experiment 1, many more new words were intruded when puzzles were easy (physical = 28.1%, semantic = 21.9%) than when words were harder to find (physical = 12.5%, semantic = 6.2%); overall main effect, F(l, 30) = 46.88, p < .001.
In the recall-own task, subjects could err by intruding a new word for that puzzle or by plagiarizing the computer's words. The balance of plagiarism versus intrusions varied with the orienting task and the puzzle's difficulty (all Fs > 4.39, ps < .05). Although the semantic orienting task reduced the total number of errors, subjects still plagiarized items from their computer partner at a higher rate than they introduced new items. As seen earlier, and in Experiment 1, increasing puzzle difficulty decreased new-word intrusions, but not the plagiarism rate, F(2, 60) = 11.18, p < .001. Again, this pattern reflected the greater number of intrusion candidates in the easier puzzles, although for both types of puzzles the same number of plagiarism candidates were generated by the computer.
Generate-new task. When subjects attempted to generate four new words that neither they nor their computer partner had previously found, the results closely mirrored those for performance during the generation task. Subjects who judged word length later plagiarized the computer's items more often (48 items, or 19.1 %; SE M =3.1) than did subjects who originally judged the goodness of each word (21 items, or 8.2%; SE M = 2.2); overall main effect, F(\, 30) = 8.13, p < .01. More of this cryptomnesia occurred in hard puzzles (physical = 32.0%, semantic = 22.7%) than in easy ones (physical = 15.6%, semantic = 2.3%); overall main effect, F(l, 30) = 16.31, p < .001, but orienting task again did not interact with puzzle difficulty, F(l, 30) < 1, p > .10. Thus, the level of cryptomnesia produced by the semantic orienting task was comparable to that observed in a semantic category generation task (9.8% in Brown & Murphy, 1989 , Experiment 3). On the other hand, a shallow orienting task or none at all (as in Experiment 1) resulted in significantly more inadvertent plagiarism than in the category generation task. Finally, the type of orienting task did not influence the rate of self-plagiarism, F( 1,30) < 1, p > . 10, although the overall rate was still substantial (physical = 12 items, or 4.7%, SE M = 1.5; semantic = 11 items, or 4.3%, SE M = 1.6).
Combined analyses. The results across task type differed somewhat from those of Experiment 1. More unconscious plagiarism occurred as subjects progressed from initial generation to the recall-own task, but comparable amounts were observed in the recall-own and the generate-new tasks, F( 1, 30) = 21.2, p < .001; we again collapsed self-and partner plagiarisms in the generate-new task. In general, both orienting tasks reduced the amount of cryptomnesia below that observed in Experiment 1, especially in the generate-new task and strikingly so when items were originally processed semantically. Orienting tasks aided subjects in discriminating new words from old words given by their computer partner (in the initial generation and generate-new tasks) but not in differentiating the source of old words as computer versus self (recall-own task). It appears that deeper encoding strengthens items in memory, but this does not materially improve memory for source information. When all tasks were combined, however, subjects who attended to physical features did plagiarize more than those engaged in semantic processing of the puzzle words, F(l, 30) = 7.91, p < .01. As before, more cryptomnesia occurred with difficult puzzles than with easy ones, F( 1, 30) = 22.66, p < .001, but only when subjects were trying to locate words (in the generation and generate new tasks), not when they were recalling their own words, F(l, 30) = 11.18, p < .001. Thus, puzzle difficulty affected the same two tasks as did the levels of processing manipulation, and neither altered the amount of cryptomnesia when subjects attempted to recall their own words. In the correlational analyses across subjects for each pair of tasks, the amount of plagiarism in the recall-own and generate-new task was again significantly related (r = .46). The correlations for the generate versus recall-own and generate versus generate-new, however, failed to reach statistical significance despite being of the approximate magnitude as in Experiment 1 (.33 and .21, respectively).
In final analyses, we examined the time it took subjects to complete the recall-own and recall-new tasks. The reaction times taken were "search times," measured from the time subjects began looking for a word in the matrix until they began to type it into the computer. Semantic processors required more time to complete both tasks than did shallow processors (semantic = 28 s/item, superficial = 22 s/item), F(l,30) = 4.80,/? < .05, and all subjects spent far more time on the recall-own (30 s/item) task than on the generate-new (21 s/item) task, F(l, 30) = 11.44,/? < .01. Subjects needed more time searching for words in the harder puzzles than in the easier ones during the generate-new task, but not when they attempted to recall their own responses, F( 1, 30) = 8.59, p < .01. This pattern suggested that determining the source among old words (in the recall-own task) was much harder than deciding whether an item was new or old; additionally, puzzle difficulty had no influence on discriminating self versus partner for old words, but puzzle difficulty was a prominent factor when locating new words and discriminating them from previously used items.
Confidence ratings. Confidence ratings for items given in the recall-own and generate-new tasks are summarized in Table 2 and show a pattern similar to that of Experiment 1. Subjects were fairly confident about their correct responses Note. Each row adds up to 100%. but were less so about their intrusions. A substantial proportion of their plagiarized and intruded items, however, was rated positive or somewhat confident. Interestingly, subjects' confidence was about the same following semantic and physical judgments, F(l, 30) = 1.5 l,p > .10. Thus, the orienting tasks affected the amount of cryptomnesia, but not the perceived novelty or correctness of the items generated. However, even this generalization had a few exceptions in Table  2 . First, with partner plagiarisms in the generate-new task, semantic judges reduced their confidence compared with word-length judges (and compared with those subjects in Experiment 1); this reduced confidence for errors coincided with a reduction in that group's plagiarism rate. Second, as in Experiment 1, subjects were more confident in their responses when asked to find new words rather than recall their earlier items, F(l, 30) = 21.0, p < .001, and this result accords with less plagiarism in the generate-new task than in the recall-own task of this experiment. Third, subjects displayed less confidence on items generated from hard puzzles (where there was more plagiarism) than from easy ones, F(l, 30) = 5.63, p < .05; this effect was more pronounced for the semantic group than for the physical judges, F(l, 30) = 8.75, p < .01.
Summary
The results of this experiment indicate that the plagiarism rate varied with original stimulus coding. Subjects who made superficial physical judgments plagiarized their computer partner significantly more often than subjects making deeper semantic judgments. Interestingly, orienting tasks had only a marginal influence on plagiarisms and new word intrusions when subjects attempted to recall their own words. Although this seems to contradict expectations from levels of processing theory (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) , it can be explained as the result of poor monitoring for self-generated versus othergenerated source information. This disparity, that an orienting task can enhance old versus new item discrimination while leaving unchanged source identification among old items, may support recent evidence for an independence of episodic and source memory. As in Experiment 1, subjects intruded words previously seen as their computer partner's at a significantly higher rate than they introduced new items. Subjects also exhibited more cryptomnesia when words were harder to locate in difficult puzzles. Finally, the orienting tasks did not generally reduce the overall amount of overconfidence that subjects displayed on plagiarized items.
Experiment 2b
Experiment 1 demonstrated that cryptomnesia was increased by retention interval and interference. Experiment 2a indicated that plagiarism rates decreased with deeper semantic processing of the items, but only when subjects made discriminations similar to those in standard recognition tests. That is, better initial learning aided subjects in deciding whether items were new versus old in the generation and generate-new tasks, but it did not affect the recall-own task that presumably involved additional judgments of source (self vs. other generated) among old items. It was this source discrimination that we tried to alter in the next experiment. Rather than improve source discrimination, we used an orienting task that we thought would decrease subjects' ability to determine whether a previously encountered word was generated by them or their computer partner. Analyzing operations in our prior experiments, subjects' self-generated items could be discriminated from computer items on several bases. First, subjects could better remember their productions because they generated them: the generation effect. Second, our procedure of having subjects type in their generated words while only having to locate and verify the computer's words most probably increased their discriminability in memory. To reduce this second factor, we asked subjects in our next experiment to perform an orienting task that required them to find and complete all of the computer's word fragments (by typing them in). We expected this method to increase the strength of computer-generated items and to reduce any encoding difference between self-generated versus computer-generated items, thus increasing source confusions.
Method
Twenty Stanford University undergraduates from the same pool as Experiments 1 and 2a served as volunteers and were awarded course credit for their participation. The same four Boggle puzzles used previously were used again in this investigation. The experimental software was revised to accept and verify subjects' completions of their computer partner's word fragments. Rather than printing a full word, the computer printed a fragment that we obtained by replacing one or two letters with a blank line. One letter was removed from all three-letter words and two letters were removed from four-letter and longer words. The letters "blanked out" were chosen to best satisfy the following constraints: (a) The letters removed made the word unambiguous within the puzzle (e.g., the completion would not take the form co. if both cot and coy were in the puzzle); (b) the letters removed always left several possible English word completions (e.g., if the target to complete was cow, the o would not be selected because there was virtually no other letter that could be used to form a common word; and (c) the first letter was never considered a candidate for removal. These constraints ensured that subjects attended well to their computer partner's words and their location within the puzzle. Moreover, subjects were not allowed to proceed until they had correctly completed the computer's word at that point. Except for word completion during generation, all aspects including the task order were identical to Experiment 2a and the delayed test condition of Experiment 1, with the recall-own and generate-new tasks being undertaken after the initial generation phase on all four puzzles.
Results and Discussion
As noted earlier, the relevant comparison for these data is the delayed test condition of Experiment 1. In brief, having subjects complete their computer partner's word fragments did not result in increased confusion between these items and the ones subjects themselves located. In fact, it slightly reduced the overall amount of plagiarism but only significantly so in the case of the generate-new task. During initial generation, subjects plagiarized 30 words, or 9.7% (SE M = 2.0), of the possible total compared with 12.2% for subjects who did not engage in the completion task, F(l, 40) < 1. When attempting to recall their own words, subjects plagiarized 102 items from the computer, or 31.9% (SE M -3.5), which closely matched the 31.8% found in Experiment 1, F(l, 40) < 1. Subjects completing the computer's word fragments exhibited slightly fewer instances of intruding new words in the recall-own task; the 42 new items they claimed as their own represented 13.1% {SE M = 1.8), which was insignificantly less than the 18.5% exhibited by the relevant comparison group in Experiment 1, F( 1,40) = 2.71, p= . 11. This new item intrusion rate was still substantially lower than the rate at which they plagiarized from the computer in the recallown task, F(l, 19) = 17.81, p < .001. As previously discussed, prior exposure to items appeared to increase their likelihood of becoming intrusion candidates compared with new words encountered in the puzzles.
In the generate-new task, subjects plagiarized only 45 items, or 14.1% {SE M = 2.1), which was substantially lower than the generate-new plagiarism rate of 28.1% for subjects in the delayed test condition of Experiment 1, F(l, 40) = 15.23,/? < .001. Although the orienting tasks in Experiment 2a similarly influenced performance during the generate and generate-new tasks, having subjects complete the computer's words reduced the cryptomnesia rates only for the generatenew task. This result implies that the word-completion task had effects that either (a) were dissociable from standard levels of processing effects or (b) lay somewhere intermediate on the continuum from physical to semantic judgments. Although sizable, the 22 cases of self-plagiarism representing 6.9% (SE M = 1.8) paralleled the 7.4% in the relevant comparison group of Experiment 1, F(l, 40) < 1. As before, the amount of plagiarism observed across tasks was reliably different, F(2, 38) = 37.44, p < .001, with more plagiarisms observed in the recall-own task than the generate-new task and more in both of these tasks than during initial generation (all fs > 4. 1,/JS < .001). Even when subjects were required to pay particularly close attention to their computer partner's words, they still had difficulty in distinguishing these words from their own but less trouble distinguishing them from new items.
The correlational analyses across subjects for each pair of tasks were generally consistent with the previous experiments; all three correlations were positive and statistically significant (ranging from .61 to .69). More plagiarism again occurred with the hard puzzles, F(l, 19) = 12.57, p < .01. Subjects' confidence ratings generally showed the same pattern as discussed before, except that the completion orienting task increased overconfidence in plagiarized items compared with that of subjects given no orienting task at all. This result supports our belief that the plagiarism observed in this paradigm was truly cryptomnesia in the sense that subjects believed (wrongly) that they were generating novel items.
Summary
Forcing subjects to complete the computer partner's word fragments did not alter source discrimination between old items that they and their computer partner generated. It did, however, reduce cryptomnesia in the generate-new task, but not reliably so during initial generation wherein subjects also had to locate new words. These findings largely replicate those of Experiment 1 and 2a but fail to provide additional information on source discrimination between computer-and self-generated old items. In the next experiment we attempted to collect more information about source confusions by having subjects perform a modified recognition memory task.
Experiment 3
Our view, as well as that of Brown and his colleagues, was that cryptomnesia in the generate-new task reflected complete forgetting that an item had occurred in the earlier experimental context, whereas the plagiarisms that occurred in the recall-own task were more properly assigned to forgetting or confusions about the item's source. We refer to these as "occurrence forgetting" and "source forgetting." The plagiarisms that arose in the generate-new task were a complex function of explicit forgetting of that item's earlier occurrence and its availability in the matrix (possibly due to priming of implicit memory) during the generation task relative to the availability of unused, alternative words. The plagiarisms in the recall-own task were reflective of source confusions: remembering that an item occurred earlier but misremembering that it was one's own. However, recall-own plagiarisms could also have arisen from occurrence forgetting if subjects simply selected that item as a guess to fill out their recall-own task (recall that subjects were required to produce four "recalled" words). Clearly, this way of counting memory errors is incomplete because it ignores cases in which during the recall-own task subjects might call to mind one of their earlier words but withhold it because they misidentify its source as the computer.
Our prior experiments can be viewed as procedures that attempted to alter the probabilities of occurrence forgetting and source forgetting. In Experiments 1 and 2a we found factors (retention interval and a physical orienting task) that increased forgetting of both types, with consequent increases in plagiarism rates in both the recall-own and the generatenew tasks. In Experiment 2b we tried a task (viz., completing and typing in the computer's word fragments) that we hoped would enhance source confusions without enhancing occurrence forgetting. The experiment clearly failed in that aim. Having to complete the computer's word fragments produced no change in later source confusions during the recallown task, and it reduced occurrence forgetting as indicated by reduced plagiarisms during the generate-new task.
Although cryptomnesia is a dramatic phenomenon to observe, under analysis it appears to be determined by a complex web of relationships among other memorial and decision processes. For example, the errors we label cryptomnesia treat memory errors in an asymmetrical manner. If, during the recall-own task, subjects misremember some of their own words as coming from their computer partner (or are unsure), then they would likely withhold those words, and we would record "nonrecall" but would ignore what was actually happening in that case. For such reasons, a more complete description of the memory and decisional processes in a typical cryptomnesia experiment might be provided by additional tests that directly examine occurrence and source forgetting. To this end, we conducted an experiment using the self-versus computer-presented words that explicitly measured subjects' later memory for both item occurrence and item source as well as plagiarisms in the recallown and recall-new tasks. We hoped to be able to use the information from occurrence and source forgetting to illuminate the observations of plagiarism as shown by the same subjects.
After this experiment was completed, an article by Brown and Halliday (1991) appeared that was based on similar reasoning. They also used an explicit test for recognition memory and source memory to aid their understanding of their cryptomnesia results. Later, we discuss the similarities between our results and theirs.
Method
Twenty-eight Stanford University undergraduates volunteered and received course credit for their participation. The general paradigm was the same as in the preceding experiments with delayed tests of recall-own and generate-new words for each puzzle. Recognition memory tests were added at the end of the task sequence after completion of the recall-own and generate-new tasks for all puzzles. Only the two easier Boggle puzzles were used in this study because drawing unused words as recognition distractors from the harder puzzles would have nearly exhausted all possible words for each puzzle. For each puzzle, a recognition test was constructed individually for each subject; it was composed of all unique words generated by the computer and the subject as well as an equal number of new items that could legitimately be located in the puzzle. The distractor items were chosen on the basis of their normative elicitation frequency. That is, the first item chosen as a lure was the one with the highest "Boggle frequency" that had not been generated by either the computer or the subject during input. The next item chosen as a distractor was the next most frequent word in our norms but not generated by the subject or the computer in that puzzle, and so on. All items in the test were randomized and presented one at a time.
As before, subjects generated words for both puzzles before receiving the recall-own and generate-new tasks for both puzzles. Thereafter, the recognition and source identification task was presented for the same two puzzles in order. With a puzzle matrix on the screen, single test words from it were presented just below it. Subjects were instructed to type one of three keys indicating whether the test word was one that they had found earlier during generation, one that the computer had located, or a completely new item not produced earlier. After making a judgment, the next word appeared and the subject repeated this for all items. This task extended standard recognition tests by requiring source discrimination (self vs. computer partner) among items identified as having occurred earlier.
Results and Discussion
Generation and recall tasks. We hypothesized that subjects in this study would perform on the recall tasks similarly to those in the delayed condition of Experiment 1 because the recognition tests were not added until after the recall tests. In this study, subjects unexpectedly displayed less plagiarism during generation on the two easy puzzles (2.9%; SE M -0.6) than did comparable subjects in Experiment 1 (for easier puzzles, 8.0%; SE M = 2.2) who solved two easy and two difficult puzzles, F{\, 48) = 6.44, p < .05. This difference might have been due to the fact that subjects in Experiment 1 worked on four puzzles rather than two, making for a longer experimental session and less care in generating words. Because the puzzles were constructed to virtually eliminate shared words between them, the higher plagiarism rate is unlikely to reflect additional interpuzzle confusions caused by working four puzzles rather than two.
This difference in plagiarism during generation, however, did not reliably carry over to recall-own and generate-new tasks. In the recall-own task, Experiment 3 subjects plagiarized 22.8% (SE M = 2.6) of the time, a rate similar to that in the comparison group from Experiment 1 (28.4%; SE M = 3.6); overall main effect, F(l, 48) = 1.71, p > .10. Recallown errors, in which subjects intruded new words as their own, were also similar between the two experimental groups. Experiment 3 subjects intruded a new item for 29.5% (SE M = 3.5) of their responses, whereas those in Experiment 1 did so for 25.6% of their responses (SE M = 4.5); overall main effect, F(\, 48) < 1.0. In the generate-new task, we again observed slightly less plagiarism as subjects attempted to locate new words (similar to original generation), but the difference was not reliable; Experiment 3 subjects plagiarized 18% (SE M = 3.1) of these new words from the computer as compared with 26% (SE M -3.9) for subjects in Experiment 1; overall main effect, F( 1,48) = 2.86, p = . 10).
On balance, these data appear to replicate our earlier findings, albeit with slightly less plagiarism occurring when subjects worked on two puzzles rather than four.
Recognition performance. Of particular interest in this study was performance on the recognition memory tests over the two puzzles. Recall that 50% of the test items were new, 37.5% were computer words, and 12.5% were self-generated during initial input. The recognition data were pooled and are summarized in Table 3 as the percentage correct identifications and source confusions conditional on the item's true origin. Subjects misclassified approximately 40% of the test items on the two tests and correctly identified an item's source only about 60% of time. Subjects were better at correctly identifying new items and their own productions than they were at identifying the computer's words, F(2, 54) = 3.47, p < .05. Among old items identified as old, fewer source confusions took the form of plagiarism (a computer's word claimed as "self occurred 16.5% of the time; SE M = 2.3) than attributing a self-generated word to the computer (25.0%; SE M = 2.9); overall main effect, F(l, 27) = 6.76, p < .05. Subjects appeared to have set their decision criteria so that, when in doubt, they attributed an old word to the computer rather than to themselves. This is similar to the false-positive effects (dubbed the "it-had-to-be-you" effect) found in a number of experiments by Johnson and her colleagues (e.g., Johnson, Raye, Foley, & Foley, 1981) . Nevertheless, a substantial amount of source forgetting occurred as indicated by subjects plagiarizing and taking credit for the computer's productions. Brown and Halliday (1991) calculated and compared indexes of source forgetting to item forgetting (which we term occurrence forgetting). Their source forgetting index was the sum of those items that subjects remembered were given but misidentified as to their original source; thus, their index would correspond to the sum of our subject's own items called computer and the computer's items called self. Their item forgetting index was computed as the sum of the misses (i.e., the sum of the old computer-generated and selfgenerated items identified as "new"). Brown and Halliday did not find an overall difference in the magnitude of these two composite error measures, and they also reported that the two indexes were uncorrelated with one another. They interpreted these findings as indicating independence of source from recognition (or recall) memory. This interpretation, however, may be questioned for two reasons. First, their overall levels of forgetting were low, causing severe restriction of range that could prevent a true positive relationship from being discovered. However, we also found no difference between these two composite error measures, F(l, 27) < 1.0, p > . 10, despite our subjects having displayed source and item forgetting 10 times greater than their subjects, who were tested immediately, and about 5 times greater than their subjects, who were tested 1 week later. The second and more important reason for questioning their conclusion of independence stemmed from our belief that their measures of source and item forgetting possessed an inherent negative relationship to one another.
To demonstrate that these two measures are conceptually and statistically correlated negatively, consider column 3 of Table 3 (where the columns add up to 100%). As the probability increases for a subject to label his or her own old items as computer, this would seem to decrease the probability of his or her labeling their remaining old items as new. That is, there is an inherent negative relation between these two conditional probabilities. However, it is these same two probabilities that are components of the separate source and item forgetting indexes, respectively. A similar negative relationship appears inherent in column 2 of Table 3 . To test these intuitions, we conducted approximately 90 Monte Carlo simulations of our recognition experiment, with 100 subjects per simulation. The simulations assumed random uniform probability distributions from 0% to 100% of the three response categories under the constraint that columns in Table 3 add up to 100%. Using Brown and Halliday's (1991) measures, we obtained a significant average negative correlation of -.51. We therefore hypothesized that Brown and Halliday's earlier finding of a nonsignificant relationship probably arose from the balancing of a true positive relationship between item and occurrence forgetting against the negative relationships inherent in the two measures. To verify this conjecture, we introduced into our simulations a random positive relationship between a component of the source index and a corresponding element of the item index (e.g., labeling selfgenerated items computer and computer-generated items new). Under these assumptions, the resulting average correlation was a small and nonsignificant .06, virtually replicating that reported by Brown and Halliday.
We have developed alternative measures of source and occurrence forgetting that appear to be uncorrelated a priori. Starting with Brown's original measure, we corrected the source forgetting index by making it the proportion of source errors (misidentified old items; i.e., Brown & Halliday's, 1991, original measure) to all old items identified as old. Likewise, we altered their item forgetting index to arrive at our occurrence forgetting measure by making it a proportion of the total number of items on the recognition test. Our simulations showed that these two measures had an average correlation of -.03 and were therefore unrelated. Using Brown's original indexes, the correlation between source and item forgetting for our subjects was a nonsignificant -.12. With our new indexes, these same data had a correlation of .27, falling just shy of conventional statistical significance. These analyses imply that source and occurrence forgetting are not independent at all. We believe that these data complement the cross-task correlational analyses reported in our prior experiments and, taken together, suggest that some stable individual differences affect source and occurrence forgetting similarly. We consider a theory of the possible common mechanism shortly.
General Discussion
Collectively, our experiments unambiguously demonstrate the existence of substantial unconscious plagiarism that is amenable to laboratory investigation. In using the puzzle paradigm, we have replicated Brown and Murphy's (1989) original findings based on category instance generation, but we have also used a creative task that more resembles situations in which cryptomnesia typically occurs. We found greater plagiarism in general than did Brown and his colleagues, implying that the natural occurrence of inadvertent plagiarism may be far greater than their results suggested. By having subjects engage in recall and recognition with the puzzles before them, we attempted to reinstate the context of original generation, as did Brown and Murphy. Our paradigm, however, differed by not involving social interaction among the participants, a setting that introduced a phenomena of its own, such as greater forgetting (and plagiarism) of words produced by the just-preceding speaker. The lack of social interaction did not appear, however, to be a limiting factor to investigation of cryptomnesia because Brown and Murphy (1989, Experiment 3) found comparable plagiarism levels when subjects were tested in social groups to when they were tested individually (with other-generated information presented visually).
We believe that much of the unconscious plagiarism observed in our experiments was truly that and was not attributable to complete item forgetting along with subsequent random reselection of the forgotten word from the associative pool. Although we cannot entirely rule out this possibility, several of our results seem to make it less probable. In the recall-own tasks, subjects more often plagiarized their computer partner's words than they intruded new words, a finding that suggests that earlier-presented items may retain associative strength in memory and thereby become likely candidates for plagiarism. Additional support for interpreting these data as true instances of unconscious plagiarism comes from subjects' confidence ratings. Although subjects were more confident in their correct recalls, they nonetheless exhibited appreciable certainty in (wrongly) classifying their plagiarized responses. In many cases, subjects truly believed that other-generated information was a product of their own efforts. This is not overwhelming evidence, and admittedly we have not clearly demonstrated that other-generated items do indeed retain activation (or priming) 3 but this assumption has allowed us to use an effective, small-scale model against which our data can be compared.
A complete theory of cryptomnesia would explain the memorial processes for storing and retaining occurrence and source information, along with the inferential and decisional processes that people use to judge available items as one's own earlier productions. Although we do not yet have such a complete theory, we can offer a relatively simple theory that accounts for some of the more salient aspects of our results.
The simple model is a modified version of the usual strength (or familiarity) theory of recognition memory (e.g., Norman & Wickelgren, 1969; Wickelgren, 1970) , similar to one proposed by Johnson in her accounts of reality monitoring. In Johnson's model, reality monitoring is affected by the nature of the traces and the types of decision processes being used. The nature of the traces is defined by (at least) four attributes: spatial and temporal, sensory, contextual, and cognitive operations. To arrive at a decision between "external" and "internal" experience, these aspects can be weighted into a sum or individually submitted to separate decision criteria.
Our model does not distinguish among trace attributes but merely supposes that all items on final recognition tests (say, in Experiment 3) exist in memory with variable degrees of strength. On average, items that the subject generated would be strongest in memory; those that a subject had seen produced by the computer would be less strong and the distractors would have the weakest strengths (see the strength distributions in Figure 3 ). We assume, as did Johnson in her model, that the subject sets two decision criteria: in our model, a strength below which an item is called "new" and one above which it is called "self-generated. If an item's strength is assessed as lying somewhere between these two criteria, it would be called "computer" produced. The farther an item's strength is from the relevant criterion, the more confident subjects'judgments should be. We fitted this model to the recognition proportions of Experiment 3 assuming that the distractors, the computer-generated items, and a subject's words come from three different Gaussian distributions of equal variances but varying mean strength. We arbitrarily fixed the mean of the distractor items at zero. Despite the simplicity of this model with only four free parameters (the two remaining means, and the two decision criteria), we were able to predict the response proportions in Table 3 rather well, X 2 (2) = 3.40, p = .20. The predicted values correlated highly with the observed proportions (r = .96), indicating that the model accounted for approximately 92% of the variance in our subjects' responses.
Figure 3 depicts this model with the parameters that best fit the observed recognition data of Experiment 3. Although the figure is based on recognition test scores, the underlying theory is consistent with the cryptomnesia results from Experiments 1 through 3. In that figure, ^ can be considered as a generate-new criterion so that any item whose strength falls below )3 will be considered new and a candidate for generation. Similarly, 0 may be considered as a recall-own threshold; items whose strength exceeds 6 would be called self. To see how this model accommodates our findings, consider N C S Associative Strength (Availability) Figure 3 . Hypothetical distributions of item strength in memory for new or distractor items (solid line; N), computer-generated items (dotted line; C), and subject-generated words (dashed line; S). (Vertical lines denote two decision criteria-/3 and 6-below which items are classified as "new" and above which they are classified as "self," respectively.)
those from Experiment 2. Suppose that the semantic orienting task of Experiment 2a strengthens both computer items and self-items in memory, moving both distributions upward in strength but slightly more so for self-generated items. This shift would result in significantly less plagiarism and better discrimination between old versus new items. The experimental results are consistent with this prediction. The orienting manipulation of Experiment 2b required subjects to find and complete the computer's words. This manipulation should have moved the average strength of computer items up toward that of subject-generated items (thus increasing the overlap in these two distributions), thereby increasing plagiarism in the recall-own task. Moving the distribution of computer-generated items higher should have decreased the overlap in the distributions of new and computer-generated items, thus reducing plagiarism in the generate-new task. The word-completion manipulation was evidently too weak to significantly influence source confusions and plagiarisms in the recall-own task, but it did reduce generate-new plagiarisms, as predicted by our model. As we noted previously, model specifies that operational characteristics are among the specific attributes that should contribute to trace recognition. By that account, our completion task should have affected source confusions in the recall-own task by decreasing discriminability of computer-and self-generated items (because word completion of computer items is now operationally more similar to finding one's own words), but it did not.
With respect to the interference and delay investigated in Experiment 1, we may assume that, as conditions promote more forgetting, the distributions of strength for both subjectand other-generated items should shift downward toward the mean of nonpresented (or distractor) items. Moreover, because all items decline progressively in strength, the distribution of self-generated items will gradually overlap to a greater extent with that for the computer-generated items, thereby increasing plagiarism via confusions among them. In addition, the fact that cryptomnesia increased across the three tasks from generation to recall-own to generate-new was likely due to the items' traces weakening over time. This explanation is consistent with the findings of Experiment 1 as well as those from Brown and Halliday (1991) .
A robust effect in our studies was that subjects plagiarized more when working on harder puzzles with fewer possible words than when working on easier ones. This effect occurred consistently in each experiment during initial generation and the generate-new task; however, puzzle difficulty did not influence plagiarism in the recall-own task. Assuming that subjects sample and evaluate words from the puzzle as they perform these tasks, we believe that these influences of puzzle difficulty arise from the nature of the decision process that the subject must make in the different tasks. In the recallown task, the outcome probably requires two decisions: to determine whether the candidate word occurred (Is its strength above /3?) and, if so, to decide who generated it (Is its strength above 0?). On the other hand, during the initial generation and the generate-new tasks, only the first decision is required because any candidate word encountered earlier, regardless of its source, should be rejected.
The "thinking time" data collected in Experiment 2a support this hypothesis. Subjects took much longer to respond in the recall-own than in the generate-new task, and puzzle difficulty influenced only time to generate new items (longer times were associated with harder puzzles). This pattern of findings for matrix difficulty may be explained by several factors. First, in recalling one's earlier words, subjects would be primarily consulting their memories of their earlier discoveries rather than the test matrix before them. Retrieval of those memories, although slow and effortful, should be relatively unaffected by the difficulty one experienced in originally discovering those words in the matrix. On the other hand, generation of new words requires subjects to find word candidates in the test matrix before them and to evaluate them (against their memory) as novel. The ease of finding more candidates is directly manipulated by the size of the possible word pool for that puzzle. Beyond the plagiarism in the recall-own task implied by the static model in Figure 3 , another possible route for plagiarisms may be suggested. While searching memory for one's own items, a computer word might come to mind but then be rejected. By virtue of that implicit retrieval, however, that computer word would acquire some additional strength so that it would become more available for retrieval somewhat later in the recall-own search and, because of its increased strength, it would (a) be likely now to exceed the upper criterion (6 in Figure 3) ; (b) be judged to be an earlier self-generated item (which, in a sense, it was); and (c) thereby be given as a plagiarized item in the recall-own task.
Second, we found that difficult matrices not only slowed generation of new words but that they also increased the plagiarism rate in the generate-new task. This increased plagiarism may be understood as follows: The scarcity of clearly novel candidate words with difficult puzzles along with the experimenter's demand that subjects produce four "new" words could induce subjects to relax their criterion (raising 0 in Figure 3 ) so that relatively more old "computer" items would be accepted as novel and thus be given as plagiarized "new" items.
We thus see that our simple strength model in Figure 3 does a reasonable job of accounting for the major parts of our data on source recognition and cryptomnesia. The model is admittedly simple in its details and ignores or is incomplete regarding several aspects. For example, Figure 3 is technically a model of recognition judgments of presented test items, not a model of recall (in which plagiarism occurs). We have implicitly used a two-component recall process (see Anderson & Bower, 1972) : a first process that generates covert candidate words for recall either according to their memory strength or their availability in the test matrix before the subject and a second process (depicted in Figure 3 ) that evaluates and decides whether to produce a candidate item according to one or another task instruction (to recall-own or generate-new). Clearly, we have not spelled out details of the first phase, retrieval, of this process. We have also ignored several routes by which "self and "other" decisions might be made. As an example, subjects assuredly have their own subjective lexicons in which certain words are either unknown or rarely occur; on later testing, they remember that one of these words occurred during the generation phase, and they can infer and confidently judge that its source was the computer, not themselves. Nonetheless, our simple model has provided a useful qualitative baseline for understanding major trends in our cryptomnesia findings and allows investigators to evaluate second-order variables and processes that affect cryptomnesia in ways not recognized by the model.
